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MEASURING BEHAVIOR CHANGE 
RESULTING FROM EORE AND THE 
NEED FOR COMPLEMENTARY RISK 
REDUCTION ACTIVITIES
By Helaine Boyd [ HALO ], Sebastian Kasack [ MAG ], and Noe Falk Nielsen [ NPA ]
R
isk education (RE) in mine action has been around since 
1992.1 However, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)2 
operators are still struggling to measure how and whether 
EORE has resulted in positive behavior change.3 Of course, various 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) methods have been pursued in 
the past, predominantly the use of knowledge, attitude, practice, and 
beliefs (KAPB) surveys; simpler pre-/post-EORE session surveys; the 
use of proxy indicators such as number of explosive ordnance (EO) 
accidents or victims; and number of explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) callouts from the community. However, these methods come 
with some limitations in accurately capturing behavior change. For 
example, survey questions linked to behavior would normally be pref-
aced as “what would you do if…” However, this self-reporting of behav-
ior does not necessarily capture actual behaviors; moreover, responses 
may be biased toward giving the “correct answer” in order to please 
the organization conducting the survey. Further, research has evalu-
ated the limits of EORE in the context of ongoing conflict, high levels 
of poverty, and/or insufficient clearance/ordnance disposal capacity. 
These circumstances lead to a lack of choices for persons living in or 
near an EO-contaminated environment to adopt safer behavior. 
This article presents a new approach to measuring behavior change, 
using a combination of qualitative and quantitative survey methods. 
It is centered around conducting focus group discussions (FGDs) 
pre-/post-EORE interventions at the community level. The approach 
is showing positive results after an initial round of piloting and 
implementation in ten countries (Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, 
Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe) 
for the past eighteen months, but it is not without its challenges.
REASONS FOR DEVELOPING THIS METHODOLOGY
The HALO Trust (HALO), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) are partnering together as part of 
the UK Department for International Development’s (DFID) second 
Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP2), which runs from 1 July 
2018 to 31 March 2021 and covers the ten countries listed previously. 
FGD with a mixed community group in Olmun Village, Battambang Province, Cambodia. Good notetaking and facilitation are key.
Photo courtesy of © Sean Sutton/MAG.
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While the “Partnership” had agreed on a standardized EORE pre-/
post-survey approach in GMAP1, we realized methods for system-
atically measuring behavior change, particularly at a community level, 
were inadequate.4 Difficulties in measuring behavior change during 
GMAP1 led the UK government to recommend the three organizations 
to seek improved ways of measuring the effects of EORE. Itad, an exter-
nal organization contracted to provide monitoring and evaluation of 
the Partnership’s work under GMAP, had written a summative evalua-
tion report for GMAP1 that recommended “to really deliver behavioral 
change, better analysis is needed that leads to nuanced delivery of MRE.”5
From this, the Partnership developed the following indicator to 
measure behavior change for the GMAP2 contract: “Percentage of 
impacted communities surveyed reporting an increase in people who 
behave in a safer manner (as a consequence of EORE).” 
The Partnership began piloting a qualitative approach to measure 
behavior change through FGDs as this methodology would (a) allow 
for open discussions in small groups between five and twelve people to 
ask follow-on questions and explore topics in-depth (b) be more rep-
resentative of the community’s behavior rather than individual behav-
ior, and (c) allow participants to report observed behaviors of other 
community members, which would not be possible from a quantitative 
KAPB survey. FGDs allow implementers to draw upon respondents’ 
attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences, and reactions in a group set-
ting.6,7 By focusing on select age, social, and gender groups, FGDs can 
create an atmosphere where people feel free to talk. Further, by having 
a specific, thematic focus on behavior towards EO, this also provides a 
concise parameter for discussion.
While mine action operators are used to conducting group inter-
views and FGDs in other areas related to humanitarian mine action, 
the Partnership felt that we had not 
fully utilized FGDs in a comprehen-
sive, rigorous manner to assess behav-
ior change with respect to EORE. Key 
questions included: How were we 
going to produce a quantitative score 
to a qualitative-heavy methodol-
ogy? How will we capture EO-related 
behavior of an entire community? We 
realized that rolling out this meth-
odology was not going to be easy and 
would require additional training of 
our in-country community outreach 
teams (COTs)8  in order to capture the 
nuance of varying behaviors and the 
underlying motives across differing 
sub-groups within communities. 
DEVELOPING THE 
METHODOLOGY
Core parameters were quite clear: 
the COTs would conduct FGDs before 
the delivery of EORE sessions in a 
given community and then again 
about three-to-six months after the EORE intervention. 
As it was the first time that this outcome indicator was used in 
DFID’s GMAP, there was an element of “piloting” M&E for this indi-
cator in the first three months of the project. Following this baseline 
phase, a lessons learned document was produced to catalogue all chal-
lenges and limitations in order to refine the methodology. The exer-
cise determined that one FGD per community is not enough and if 
possible, multiple FGDs should be conducted with distinct groups, 
such as local leaders, women, youth, and/or specific risk-takers such as 
shepherds. Country contexts are wide-ranging during conflict, post- 
conflict, and in-development; and community acceptance of mine 
action activities and participatory approaches can vary widely 
depending on these circumstances. The capacity of our COTs also 
varied significantly. Too many of our staff were used to asking sug-
gested questions in a script-like fashion, and did not probe deeper; and 
most importantly, they asked leading questions and judged partici-
pants’ answers. Initially, we had envisioned that the FGD methodol-
ogy would have a sample size of 20 percent of all communities where 
EORE is being conducted under the GMAP2 contract. However, it was 
later found that for some countries this was an overwhelming burden 
Examples of some of the open-ended questions include: 
 » What do you consider are safe behaviors towards EO? 
 » What are unsafe behaviors? 
 » What do you do when encountering explosive ordnance in  
contaminated areas? 
 » What reasons, if any, prevent you from taking a safer approach 
to the explosive ordnance threat? 
There are approximately nine to ten questions asked in each FGD, 
with the potential for numerous follow-up questions depending on 
the responses given. 
HALO staff conducting a focus group discussion with a mine-affected community in Anlong Veng District, Cambodia.
Photo courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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Table 1. Scoring matrix (on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 is very unsafe, 5 is very safe). 
Table courtesy of authors. 
Scoring Matrix (on a scale of 1–5, 1 being very unsafe to 5 being very safe)
# The FGD exhibits the following behaviors/overall assessment Examples
1 FGD participants/community members are knowingly engaging in very unsafe activity/or it is 
implied that this activity is still happening, despite no strong reason for economic necessity. (the 
Reckless)
FGD participants/community members engage in unsafe behavior because they are mostly not 
aware of the threat. Common belief that EO is not dangerous. (the Unaware)
No one, or very few members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively safe 
behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)
• Refugees or IDPs in a conflict 
affected country moving into 
contaminated areas without any 
knowledge of RE messaging
• Ex-military or young boys who 
are reckless and refuse to believe 
EO is dangerous
• Scrap metal collectors/explosive 
harvesters
2 FGD participants/community members are aware of the threat, but do not know sufficiently how to 
behave more safely. (the Uninformed)
FGD participants/community members knowingly use contaminated land (not applicable for 
cluster strike areas) due to economic desperation, but may use well-trodden pathways while doing 
so to avoid hazards. (the Forced)
Very few, or at least less than the majority of members  in the community/FGD participants are 
engaging in actively safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected 
dangerous areas)
• Poor communities using the land 
for cultivation out of desperation
• Women/vulnerable groups who 
are isolated in rural communities 
and do not receive adequate RE
3 A majority of FGD participants and other community members do not actively use the contaminat-
ed land; they seek safer areas for their livelihoods; unsafe behavior seems to be out of a misunder-
standing of key RE messages or lack of trust of clearance response (i.e., moving an item to a tree or 
landmark to avoid the item being in the pathway of someone else) (the Misinformed/Forced) or fear 
(i.e., when an item is found, it is no longer picked up, but communities may not report to authorities 
out of fear of retribution).
Half or a small majority of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively 
safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)
4 FGD participants/community members do not report any unsafe behaviors, hazardous areas are 
avoided, and people who did unsafe practices in the past have stopped doing so. A large majority 
of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively safe behaviors (reporting 
to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)
5 FGD participants/community members report mostly safe behaviors, and have actively and consis-
tently reported items to authorities; they warn their children and newcomers about the threat.
All or at least a 90% majority of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in 
actively safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous 
areas)
• Communities with legacy 
contamination who have been 
living with mines for a long time 
and have a well-established 
reporting response mechanism 
to authorities
on COT planning and would threaten the delivery of EORE session 
targets in some cases. Jeopardizing the humanitarian objective of the 
project was not an option. The sample size was thus redefined as “up to 
20 percent of communities” to allow for some flexibility.
Specific and comprehensive guidelines were developed following 
the lessons learned exercise. Notably, better guidance was needed to 
properly train COTs. For example, finding the exact same participants 
for post-EORE FGDs is no longer binding to allow for some flexibility 
when gathering participants for the post-EORE FGD, as long as they 
had participated in the EORE session in the first place.
Analyzing the results of each FGD and then for the entire commu-
nity may possibly be the riskiest part of this approach. The reasons for 
ranking a community in relation to its behaviors toward EO must be 
well explained. The matrix itself along with the guidance will likely 
need to be refined over time as more lessons are learned. 
THE METHODOLOGY
The FGD methodology allows for capturing qualitative information, 
which is imperative in measuring behavior change through a quantita-
tive scoring process. COTs raise with the participants a series of core 
topics, each with open-ended and follow-up questions, with the pur-
pose of obtaining detailed information on behavior toward EO in the 
community. Examples of some of the open-ended questions include: 
What do you consider are safe behaviors towards EO? What are unsafe 
behaviors? What do you do when encountering EO in contaminated 
areas? What reasons, if any, prevent you from taking a safer approach 
to the EO threat? There are approximately nine to ten questions asked 
in each FGD, with the potential for numerous follow-up questions 
depending on the responses given.  
From there, the COTs record comprehensive notes of the FGD. These 
notes are then immediately analyzed by the facilitator and note taker, 
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State/
Region Teams FGDs
1st Round Community Safety Score 2nd Round Community Safety Score
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Shan 1 9 3 3 3 1 8
Kayin 2 12 1 1 9 1 1 2 7 2
Tanintharyi 2 36 6 11 19 1 1 2 32
TOTAL 5 57 1 10 23 23 0 2 3 20 42 0
1.8% 17.5% 40.4% 40.4% 0.0% 3.5% 5.3% 17.5% 73.7% 0.0%
 Table 2. MAG FGD analysis in Myanmar. Number and absolute scores of FGDs before and after conducting EORE.
State/
Region Communities
Lower 
Score
Same 
Score
Higher 
Score
Shan 9 0 3 6
Kayin 12 4 5 3
Tnintharyi 36 3 17 16
TOTAL 57 7 25 25
12% 44% 44%
Table 3. MAG FGD analysis in Myanmar. Comparison between pre-EORE and post-
EORE FGD scores.
Liaison staff conducted pre-EORE FGDs in eighty-three communities 
in three different States/Regions and post-EORE FGDs in fifty-seven of 
these communities (see Table 2).      
Although there are still two communities that reported knowingly 
engaging in unsafe behaviors (Category 1), there has been a 12.2 per-
cent decrease in the number of communities knowingly engaging in 
unsafe behavior out of survival imperatives (Category 2), and a 22.9 
percent decrease in the number of communities that report examples 
of unsafe behavior stemming from ignorance or fear (Category 3). In 
the second round of FGDs, 73.7 percent of targeted communities did 
not report any unsafe behaviors but did not consistently report items 
to authorities (Category 4), a 33.3 percent increase from the first round. 
A surprising result showed 12 percent of targeted communities 
received a lower score in the post-EORE FGDs than in the pre-EORE 
FGD. In three out of seven of these villages, there were incidents 
of community members engaging in risky behavior despite hav-
ing received EORE. In one notable incident, a local pastor who had 
received EORE was ploughing a field with a group of young men who 
had not received EORE when they encountered an item of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO). Instead of sharing key safety messages and warn-
ing them to not touch the item, the pastor played with the EO, throw-
ing it to the other men he was with, as was reported in one FGD. The 
remaining communities have a lower score in the post-EORE FGDs, 
not because the communities are behaving in a more unsafe way 
since they attended an EORE session but rather because the partici-
pants were not forthcoming in discussing risky behavior when MAG 
Community Liaison teams conducted the pre-EORE FGD. A key les-
son learned is that the data gathered in the first FGD might not always 
be fully representative due to initial lack of trust. However, the FGD 
process was invaluable in building relationships with the local com-
munities, particularly in highly-militarized villages,11 and communi-
ties often participated more freely in the post-EORE FGDs. Being able 
to directly address what the participants have been told in the FGDs 
helps to make future EORE more tailored and hopefully for the mes-
sages to sink in more. The process of having a discussion makes the 
community address the challenges together and understand whether 
they have different beliefs about what to do. This is helpful because 
if unsafe practices are identified, then the elders can specifically take 
ownership over not allowing this to happen in the future. 
In Somaliland, seven out of the eight communities who have par-
ticipated in both a pre-/post-EORE FGD conducted by HALO have 
reported positive behavior change, with only one exhibiting no change 
in behavior. This particular community who did not exhibit more 
with non-biased analysis provided by a senior member responsible for 
community liaison and EORE. The person responsible for analyzing 
the FGD data then produces a summary paragraph explaining the cur-
rent state of behavior towards EO. This summary may include iden-
tifying the risk profiles of a community, with the understanding that 
multiple risk profiles may be present in a community at any given time. 
Risk profiles are broken down into five categories and can be ascribed 
to individuals but also groups, ranging from Unaware, Uninformed, 
Misinformed, Reckless, to Forced.9
SCORING SYSTEM
The scoring matrix ranks communities on a scale from one to five: 
from a very high risk-taking community (#1) to one where a majority of 
members in the community conduct safe behaviors related to EO (#5). 
It is important to note that this scoring matrix comes with a number 
of caveats that are detailed in the overarching FGD guidance document.10 
Primarily, scoring of an FGD session should be done with the under-
standing of whether a majority or minority of community members 
carry out safe or unsafe behaviors toward EO. We have termed this the 
“none/some/all” approach to scoring. Further, the scoring of the post-
EORE FGD three-to-six months later should be mindful of the summary 
paragraph from the pre-EORE FGD to see if the amount of community 
members exhibiting unsafe behaviors has reduced since the EORE ses-
sion. Without this general quantifying of community members, it will 
become difficult to give a realistic score as it is quite likely for a commu-
nity to exhibit both safe and unsafe behaviors at the same time.
OUTCOMES: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES
A positive outcome from using this methodology has been that it has 
increased trust between affected groups and mine action operators in 
communities, which has been significant in the context of Myanmar, 
where conflict sensitivity is paramount.
Talking about EO in Myanmar is still a very sensitive subject, even 
in areas where there has been no fighting for years. MAG Community 
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positive behavior following EORE continued to report identified EO 
and spread awareness as they had done previously but struggled to 
convey key messages to nomadic populations. Further, while the FGD 
methodology can build trust in certain communities, it can also have 
the opposite effect in some contexts where communities exhibit survey 
fatigue. In some communities in Somaliland, people have been waiting 
for clearance for almost twenty years and are frustrated that clearance 
has not yet started in their community.  
There are several FGDs that HALO in Somaliland did not end up 
using for analysis because (a) the data was insufficient or (b) biased 
answers or leading questions were suspected. In these instances, the 
information is still used for qualitative purposes and future EORE 
project design, but the statistics are not included when reporting on 
the outcome indicator. As this methodology takes a lot more time 
than other types of M&E methods due to the nuance required, it is 
important that all operators conduct continual monitoring and qual-
ity assurance of the COTs to ensure that high-quality qualitative 
information is being collected for FGDs or confirm that the informa-
tion is unusable for scoring.
Overall, the FGD methodology in Somaliland has proven to be 
hugely successful. The notes produced from the FGDs illustrate that 
communities have exhibited greater awareness of behavior towards EO 
among community members, and that conducting the FGDs allows 
COTs to stay a bit longer, build trust, and has resulted in more people 
reporting items found or stockpiled at home. While the primary objec-
tive of the FGDs is to understand behavior change, they have proved 
to be great centers of debate, and provide the COTs with valuable, con-
textual information, which has then been used to tailor future EORE 
sessions to specific groups and where it is most needed. 
In Cambodia, HALO has conducted 20 complete pre-/post-EORE 
FGDs of which eleven communities have reported increased safer 
behavior. The challenge with ongoing EORE in Cambodia is that 
much like other legacy contamination countries, it is understood that 
behaviors may not have changed for many years as some have adapted 
over time to risky or forced behavior because of the lack of alternative 
options to livelihoods. 
In Zimbabwe, NPA is working mainly along the border with 
Mozambique. The mines emplaced along this border impede the 
FGD conducted by NPA in the village of Kimunza Nzadi, Angola.
Photo courtesy of NPA.
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access of small scale and commercial farmers as well as timber com-
panies to manage forestry.
NPA has applied the FGD methodology since 2018 with guarded 
success. The FGDs have provided NPA with valuable information for 
understanding the differences in vulnerability, roles, and needs of the 
respective age groups, sex, and traits in the communities, allowing the 
program to improve planning and EORE quality accordingly.
Despite the benefits of the approach, NPA has experienced a num-
ber of challenges in the implementation. Large parts of the popula-
tion are seasonal workers, which makes it difficult to keep track of the 
same group of people for between three and six months for the post 
EORE FGD. In addition, working adults have shown limited interest 
in dedicating the required time for FGDs, making it difficult to ensure 
representational participation.
As for the actual discussions, NPA occasionally experienced that the 
community provided COTs with the “correct answers” while continu-
ing to practice unsafe behavior, e.g., cultivating crops in contaminated 
areas for economic reasons. Thus, the method requires the building of 
sufficient trust to ensure the community is open to talk about its needs 
and reasons for undertaking unsafe behavior. Follow-up visits to con-
taminated areas to verify that the community follows its own stated 
behavior may be an option to validate FGD findings.
Such cases illustrate yet again that the mine action sector needs to 
work closely with other sectors, i.e., development NGOs, authorities, 
etc., in order to ensure positive behavior change by offering people 
something beyond mere advice on safer behavior. Structural causes 
must be understood and addressed. As such, it is important to take 
note of the lack of fully honest answers and stated answers versus actual 
behavior change. NPA also noted that the rigidity of the scoring did 
not allow for the program to report on subtle changes in stated behav-
ior resulting from the EORE sessions. As illustrated in Figure 3, three 
out of seven communities showed positive changes in pre-/post-EORE 
sessions. The program highlighted that even though the level of under-
standing of the threat was raised, a majority of people within the com-
munity continued to undertake unsafe, forced behavior, leaving the 
score unchanged. Thus, without proper explanation, the statistics will 
convey a somewhat incomplete picture of the impact. However, this is 
only a reporting issue. The FGD clearly showed that the program would 
have to link in with other sectors to properly address the forced unsafe 
behavior as EORE in itself would not be a sufficient measure. Broader 
reach of the FGDs, or discussions jointly undertaken with other sectors 
could lead to a better understanding of the keys to change behavior.
EO RISK EDUCATION AND 
EO RISK REDUCTION
People opt for dangerous behav-
ior when they see no other choice. 
For example, when sourcing drink-
ing water, gathering firewood, or 
finding areas for hunting, these may 
only be reached by passing through 
a minefield, thereby knowingly put-
ting their lives at risk to sustain 
their livelihoods. Children may not 
know or simply forget safe behavior; 
for instance when they stray playing 
hide and seek, but this is something 
Muzuru Village
Ratelshoek Estate
Mandadzaka Village
Mazundu Village
Foroma Village
Marufu Village
Muzite Village
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Post PRE
Figure 3. NPA FGD Analysis in Zimbabwe.
HALO FGD Analysis in Somalia
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Figure 1. HALO FGD Analysis in Somalia.
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Figure 2. HALO FGD Analysis in Cambodia. 
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that can be more easily addressed through EORE and attention from 
well-informed parents, siblings, and friends. 
Some groups, like ex-combatants and those designated as “village 
deminers” will often deliberately, recklessly take very high risks to 
enter hazardous areas to remove EO. They do this to support other 
villagers or to make a bit of money. Farmers and shepherds come 
across numerous items of EO in certain countries. Often, they decide 
to move the items themselves, motivated by protecting their children 
or their livestock. Why do they not report these EO items to the local 
authorities instead of putting themselves at risk? Perhaps because the 
response takes too long, or out of fear of reprisal. FGDs help to find 
answers to these questions and to explore more relevant and realistic 
suggestions to behavior change—suggestions that are community-
driven and context specific. 
Other behavior proves even more challenging to address. For 
example when people keep EO with a profit motive in mind: chil-
dren in Laos have sold cluster munitions so they have money to buy 
ice cream; to harvest explosives for blast fishing (a very destructive 
practice for the environment)12 or to blow up stones/rocks; to harvest 
high-value metals from EO; or simply to use EO as construction mate-
rial. How can we reduce the risks by persons who are either forced to 
continue this behavior or see no reason why they should stop their 
reckless behavior, often putting bystanders including family members 
at unacceptable risk?
Effective risk reduction13 must go beyond “just” EORE and should 
include options for safer alternatives to livelihoods in affected commu-
nities. For example, a safe playground may be built to reduce children 
playing in unsafe areas, firewood as fuel can be reduced by 50 percent 
when using fuel-saving stoves, and drilling a borehole may stop people 
from going through the minefield to the river to collect water. These 
alternative projects may be best placed in certain communities while 
inappropriate in others, so context is key. Some mine action operators 
may not have capacity to implement these projects directly, so partner-
ing with wider relief and development organizations may be essential. 
For the post-EORE FGD we added a question on why some behavior 
did change or did not change for this exact reason.
CONCLUSION
Using FGDs to measure behavior change has worked but has its lim-
its when applied within a short timeframe of three-to-six months after 
an intervention. Sustained behavior change will only manifest itself 
over time and, therefore, must be planned and implemented beyond 
any donor funding cycle. 
The Oslo Action Plan, agreed upon at the fourth review conference 
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in November 2019, aims to 
steer the mine action community for the coming five years. It calls for 
risk reduction in the context of EORE: 
Action point 28: “Integrate mine risk education activities with 
wider humanitarian, development, protection and education efforts, 
as well as with ongoing survey, clearance and victim assistance activi-
ties to reduce the risk to the affected population and decrease their 
need for risk-taking.”14
Action point 30: “Prioritise people most at risk by linking mine 
risk education and reduction programmes and messages directly 
to an analysis of available casualty and contamination data, an 
understanding of the affected population’s behaviour, risk pat-
tern and coping mechanisms, and, wherever possible, anticipated 
population movements.” 
As highlighted previously, implementing risk reduction projects 
will often be beyond the scope of mine action itself and require an 
integrated approach. FGDs, as presented in this article, allow opera-
tors to gain a better, context-specific understanding of affected com-
munity’s needs as it relates to risk reduction. The population 
understands better who we are, why we are there, and what we can 
offer. As operators, we can use the information gathered from the 
FGDs to improve our work by refining targeting, messaging, and 
identifying risk reduction alternatives. 
See endnotes page 69
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